https://crsreports.congress.gov
Updated January 16, 2024
Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions Policy
Since 2005, the United States has imposed sanctions on
Venezuelan individuals and entities that have engaged in
criminal, antidemocratic, and/or corrupt actions. The Trump
Administration expanded U.S. sanctions beyond
individually targeted sanctions to include broader financial
sanctions, sectoral sanctions, and sanctions on the
government of Nicolás Maduro. Those sanctions failed to
dislodge Maduro and contributed to an economic crisis in
the country that has prompted 7.7 million Venezuelans to
flee. The Biden Administration has sought to leverage
sanctions relief to incentivize Maduro to allow presidential
elections in 2024 to be as free and fair as possible, but the
Venezuelan government has thus far continued to bar
opposition primary winner Maria Corina Machado from
running.
Recent Developments
On October 18, 2023, the Biden Administration issued
licenses easing energy sanctions on Venezuela through
April 2024 after Maduro and the opposition signed the
Barbados Accord, which included a roadmap toward
holding competitive elections. U.S. officials warned that the
licenses could be revoked if the Maduro government did
not create a process to allow all barred candidates to run
and release wrongfully detained Americans and Venezuelan
political prisoners.
In late November 2023, the Maduro government announced
that candidates barred from office could appeal to the
supreme court. Machado appealed; the court’s decision is
pending. In December, the Maduro government released 20
political prisoners, 10 imprisoned Americans, and Leonard
Francis, an American fugitive indicted in a naval bribery
scandal. In addition to sanctions relief, the United States
released Alex Saab, a U.S.-sanctioned ally of Maduro
indicted on U.S. money laundering charges.
The 118th Congress is closely monitoring the degree to
which the Maduro government complies with the Barbados
Accord linked to U.S. sanctions relief and could seek to
modify U.S. sanctions policy. Unless otherwise noted,
information in this product is drawn from the Treasury
Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).
The product does not discuss foreign aid restrictions.
Visa Restrictions
Since FY2018, the State Department has imposed visa
restrictions related to corruption or human rights abuses
pursuant to Section 7031(c) of annual Department of State,
Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations
acts on 15 Venezuelans. The State Department also has
privately revoked the visas of Venezuelans, including those
of current Venezuelan officials and their families.
Terrorism-Related Sanctions
Since 2006, the Secretary of State has made an annual
determination (most recently in May 2023) that Venezuela
is not “cooperating fully with United States anti-terrorism
efforts” pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export
Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2781). The United States has
prohibited all U.S. commercial arms sales and retransfers to
Venezuela. U.S. Department of Commerce export controls
related to Venezuela affect dual-use technology, including
expanded restrictions since mid-2020 on sales to military
end users. In 2008, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.)
13224, the U.S. Treasury Department designated two
individuals and two travel agencies in Venezuela as
Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) subject to asset
blocking sanctions for financially supporting Hezbollah, a
U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization.
Drug Trafficking-Related Sanctions
Treasury has imposed asset blocking sanctions on 11
individuals and 25 companies with connections to
Venezuela by designating them as Specially Designated
Narcotics Traffickers pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics
Kingpin Designation Act (P.L. 106-120, Title VIII, as
amended; 21 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.).
Targeted Sanctions Related to Antidemocratic
Actions, Human Rights Violations, and Corruption
In response to increasing repression in Venezuela, Congress
enacted the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil
Society Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-278; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
Among its provisions, the law required the President to
impose sanctions on those the President identified as
responsible for significant acts of violence, serious human
rights abuses, or antidemocratic actions. Congress extended
these sanctions authorizations through 2023 in P.L. 116-94.
President Obama issued E.O. 13692 to implement P.L. 113-
278 in March 2015, and Treasury issued regulations in July
2015 (31 C.F.R. Part 591). The E.O. targets (for asset
blocking and visa restrictions) those involved in actions or
policies undermining democratic processes or institutions;
serious human rights abuses; prohibiting, limiting, or
penalizing freedom of expression or peaceful assembly; and
public corruption. It includes any person who is a current or
former leader of any entity engaged in any of those
activities, as well as current or former government officials.
Even though the sanctions authorities in P.L. 116-94
expired in December 2023, the President still has the
authority to impose them under E.O. 13692.
Treasury has imposed SDN sanctions on more than 110
Venezuelans and at least eight entities pursuant to E.O.
13692. Those individuals include President Maduro, his
wife, and his son; Vice President Delcy Rodríguez; Defense
Minister Vladimir Padrino Lopez; supreme court judges;
Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions Policy
https://crsreports.congress.gov
and governors. The Biden Administration has not
designated any new individuals or entities to date.
Additional Financial Sanctions
President Trump imposed additional financial sanctions on
Venezuela in response to the government’s human rights
abuses and antidemocratic actions. In August 2017,
President Trump issued E.O. 13808, which prohibited
access to U.S. financial markets by the Venezuelan
government, including state energy company Petróleos de
Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), with certain exceptions intended
to minimize the impact on the Venezuelan people and U.S.
interests. In March 2018, President Trump issued E.O.
13827 to prohibit transactions involving the Venezuelan
government’s issuance of digital currency, coin, or token.
In May 2018, President Trump issued E.O. 13835, which
prohibited transactions related to purchasing Venezuelan
debt and any debt owed to Venezuela pledged as collateral.
Broader Sectoral Sanctions
On November 1, 2018, President Trump issued E.O. 13850.
This E.O. set forth a framework to block the assets of, and
prohibit certain transactions with, any person determined by
the Secretary of the Treasury to operate in designated
sectors of the Venezuelan economy or to engage in corrupt
transactions with the Maduro government.
On January 28, 2019, pursuant to E.O. 13850, Treasury
designated PdVSA as operating in the oil sector of the
Venezuelan economy and the Secretary of the Treasury
determined the company was subject to U.S. sanctions. The
E.O froze all property and interests in property of PdVSA
subject to U.S. jurisdiction and prohibited U.S. persons
(companies or individuals) from engaging in transactions
with the company. Treasury also sanctioned Venezuela’s
Central Bank, National Development Bank, and state-
owned gold company, Minerven. Treasury has imposed
sanctions pursuant to E.O. 13850 on 22 individuals, 91
entities, and 47 vessels, none of which were designated
under the Biden Administration.
Sanctions on the Maduro Government
In August 2019, President Trump issued E.O. 13884,
freezing the assets of the Maduro government in the United
States and within the control of U.S. persons. The order
prohibited U.S. persons from engaging in transactions with
the Maduro government unless authorized by OFAC. E.O.
13884 also authorized financial sanctions and visa
restrictions on non-U.S. persons who assist the Maduro
government. There are five individuals and one entity
designated under this executive order, none of which were
designated by the Biden Administration.
To allow assistance to the Venezuelan people, OFAC
issued licenses authorizing transactions involving the
delivery of food, agricultural commodities, and medicine;
remittances; international organizations; and
communications services. A 2021 Government
Accountability Office report found that, despite those
licenses, overcompliance with U.S. sanctions had limited
some humanitarian assistance to Venezuelans.
Biden Administration: Licenses
Since 2019, OFAC has issued and amended licenses to
allow certain transactions. The Biden Administration has
issued licenses to encourage the Maduro government to
negotiate a path to free and fair elections. In May 2022,
OFAC allowed Chevron, the only major U.S. energy
company still in Venezuela, to discuss future operations
with PdVSA. In November 2022, after negotiations
restarted, OFAC issued a license allowing Chevron to
resume production, import, and export of petroleum
products at its existing joint ventures in Venezuela. On
October 18, 2023, Treasury
• issued a six-month general license temporarily
authorizing transactions involving the oil and gas sector
in Venezuela;
• issued another general license authorizing transactions
with Minerven, in part to reduce illicit gold trading; and
• removed bans on the secondary trading of certain
Venezuelan bonds and PdVSA debt and equity.
Resuming oil trade with Venezuela and allowing
Venezuelan gas to be developed and exported to European
allies could advance U.S. energy and security interests.
These licenses also may bolster Venezuela’s economy and
reduce emigration, another U.S. policy goal. It remains to
be seen whether the Biden Administration will extend these
licenses beyond April 2024, however, as few observers
predict that Maduro officials will allow even a minimally
competitive election to occur.
Congressional Considerations
Congress has maintained broad support for a negotiated
solution to the crisis in Venezuela leading to free and fair
elections. In 2019, Congress enacted P.L. 116-94, which
included the Venezuela Emergency Relief, Democracy
Assistance, and Development (VERDAD) Act (S. 1025).
The law extended targeted sanctions regarding corruption
and undemocratic actions through 2023. Legislation to
reauthorize sanctions authorities in the VERDAD Act has
been introduced but not considered (H.R. 6831/S. 3363).
Other introduced legislation would create new sanctionable
offenses (H.R. 5670), impose visa restrictions on
individuals who support Venezuela (S. 1129), and codify
selected executive orders and create U.S. foreign aid
restrictions on countries that militarily support Venezuela
(S. 995).
Some in Congress have supported sanctions relief, arguing
that broad sanctions have not achieved their aims and have
hurt the Venezuelan people. In contrast, other Members of
Congress have opposed sanctions relief and have
introduced legislation that would prohibit U.S. imports of
Venezuelan oil (S. 3053). They have urged the Biden
Administration to revoke the licenses granted in October
2023, arguing the Maduro-aligned supreme court is unlikely
to allow Machado’s candidacy. See CRS In Focus IF10230,
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy.
Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American
Affairs
Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions Policy
https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10715 · VERSION 44 · UPDATED
IF10715
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.